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IV4SHINGTON LAW REUIE4V
requirement in Kent that the statute be read in the light of constitu-
tional principles of due process and the assistance of counsel,22 the
Kent result should have been adopted.
Gault established that the loss of liberty attendant upon a juvenile
court determination of guilt is analogous to criminal incarceration.23
If counsel is required at the adjudication stage, counsel should also
by implication be required at the waiver proceeding where access to
juvenile court is determined. 24
Adequate consideration of either the critical stage of Kent-Gault
rationale should have led the court to the conclusion that counsel was
required for defendant in the principal case. It is to be hoped that
other courts, guided by the Gault decision and its interpretation of
Kent, would require appointment of counsel at waiver. Decisions such
as the principal case bode ill for state court reception of Supreme
Court cases relating to juvenile court due process.
SURVEY OF ABORTION REFORM LEGISLATION*
During the past year governments have felt increasing pressure for
reform of their abortion statutes. California, Colorado, North Caro-
lina, and Great Britain' recently enacted new abortion statutes.
Abortion statutes 2 seek two ends: 1) a definition of the crime of
2 383 U.S. at 551 (1966).
' See note 18 supra.
-'For further discussion on the distinction between juvenile proceedings and
criminal proceedings, see note 10 supra.
*"Abortion" elicits numerous moral and philosophical responses. This note does
not attempt to review the general discussions which surround these responses. This
posture was adopted for two reasons: 1) the extent to which the new abortion
statutes evidence a shift of moral or philosophical stance is at best conjectural and
2) the doctrinal approach has received generous space in other works. See generally
ABORTION- AND THE LAW (D. Smith ed. 1967), first published in 17 W. RES. L. REv.
369 (1965). See also, Lorensen, Abortion and the Crime-Sin Spectrum, 70 WEST. VA.
L. REv. 20 (1967).
'The official text of the British statute is not available at the time of this
writing. Reference in this note to that statute is based on the reproduction of the
crucial sections of the Abortion Bill as of its second reading in the House of
Commons found at Samuels, Termination of Pregnancy-A Lawyer Considers the
Arguments, 7 MED. ScI. & LAw 10, 11 (1967).
2 Under the common law, induced abortion prior to "quickening" was not crim-
inal. Comment, The Legal Status of Therapeutic Abortion, 27 U. PITT. L. REv. 669,
672 (1965-66). "Quickening" was taken as that stage of gestation-usually sixteen
to twenty weeks following conception-when the mother first feels fetal movements.
The rule is perhaps best stated by Blackstone: "Life... begins in contemplation of
law as soon as the infant is able to stir in the mother's womb." I CO.MM1ENTARIES
129 (14th ed. 1803). It was believed that life or soul entered the fetus at this time.
This view is often attributed to St. Thomas Aquinas. G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY
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abortion and 2) the creation of a procedure for implementing the
statute definition. Definition is accomplished by declaring purposeful
miscarriage unlawful except in certain generalized situations.3 The
procedure then designates who determines when an excepting situation
exists. Therefore, the decision to terminate a pregnancy raises two
issues-who shall make the decision and on what bases. This note
will examine the impact of recent abortion reform legislation on these
issues.
WHO MAKES THE DECISION?
The most permissive procedure would designate the mother as
decision-maker. This could be characterized as termination on de-
mand. The rationale for such a procedure may stem from the feeling
that:
4
In a pluralist, secular society freedom of choice is a desirable moral and
social aim provided that no harm is inflicted upon others, individually
and collectively, the interests of society are not adversely affected, and
the burden placed upon the medical profession is not unmeasurable.
The failure of any state legislature to adopt this procedure may
evidence the non-qualification of contemporary America as "a plural-
ist, secular society" or merely that "the interests of society" include
the preservation of a common attitude toward the sanctity of life as
reflected by the criminal code. The rejection is clearly not due to
administrative difficulty because demand is the only requisite for
termination.
The abortion statute of the State of Washington presents the typical
American procedure. 5 Determinations relevant to termination are
oF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 151 (1957). But the 1803 English codification of
the law of abortion rejected the common law rule and declared that abortion prior
to quickening was a felony-though a lesser crime than abortion committed after
quickening. 43 Geo. 3, c. 58 (1803). The crime of abortion could be committed at
any time from conception to delivery.
'The term abortion thus becomes a term of art usually connoting illegality. That
this connotation is less than universal is demonstrated by Colorado's use of the term
"Criminal Abortion." This note will refer to abortion as an illegally intended mis-
carriage.
'Samuels, supra note 1, at 16.
'WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.02.010 (1950):
Every person who, with intent thereby to produce the miscarriage of a woman,
unless the same is necessary to preserve her life or that of the child whereof she
is pregnant, shall-
(1) Prescribe, supply, or administer to a woman, whether pregnant or not, or
advise or cause her to take any medicine, drug or substance; or,
(2) Use, or cause to be used, any instrument or other means;
Shall be guilty of abortion, and punished by imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary for not more than five years, or in the county jail for not more than one year.
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implicitly left to the person performing the operation. Under this
procedure, the practitioner examines his patient, reads the statute.
and then acts. Like termination on demand, the Washington proce-
dure provides for a preoperation decision to be made by a single
individual. Unlike the former, however, the practitioner's decision
to terminate under Washington law is reviewable in a criminal pro-
ceeding. The problem of the traditional approach is one of precisely
controlling conduct through the criminal code. Because the practition-
er's decision creates potential liability, he may hesitate to perform
termination in any but the most obvious case. In this way the statute
may have an unintended "chilling effect" on conduct. The Washington
procedure may also lead to modification of the statute by the medical
profession. This is possible because case law indicates that the deci-
sion to terminate will be judged in terms of prevailing medical opinion.'
An operation which seems to violate the statute becomes immune
from prosecution if the medical profession approves of the termination.
The recent reforms in California, Colorado, North Carolina, and
Great Britain attempt to construct an authoritative preoperation pro-
cedure which can operate within the time limits of human gestation.
The California law requires that the operation be approved by the
medical staff committee of an accredited hospital.7 The Colorado
procedure is similar.' North Carolina requires three doctors, not
engaged in joint practice, to certify that examination indicates legal
In State v. Powers, 155 Wash. 63, 67, 283 P. 489 (1929) the court said:
If the appellant, in performing the operation, did something which was recog-
nized and approved by those reasonably skilled in his profession practicing in the
same community with him and the same line of practice, then it cannot be said
that the operation was not necessary to preserve the life of the patient.
'CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 25951 (West Supp. 1967):
(a) The abortion takes place in a hospital which is accredited by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.
(b) The abortion is approved in advance by a committee of the medical staff of
the hospital, which committee is established and maintained in accordance with
standards promulgated by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals.
In any case in which the committee of the medical staff consists of no more than
three licensed physicians and surgeons, the unanimous consent of all committee
members shall be required in order to approve the abortion.
'Ch. 190, [1967] Colo. Sess. Laws 284:
(4) (a) "Justified medical termination" means the intentional ending of
the pregnancy of a woman at the request of said woman or if said woman is
under the age of 18 years, then at the request of said woman and her then living
parent or guardian, or if the woman is married and living with her husband
at the request of said woman and her husband, by a licensed physician using
accepted medical procedures in a fully accredited hospital upon written certifi-
cation by all of the members of a special hospital board....
(5) "Special hospital board" means a committee of three licensed physi-
cians who are members of the staff of the hospital where the proposed termina-
tion would be performed if certified in accordance with this act and who meet
[ \,oL. 43 :639
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termination under the statutory conditions.' The English reform
allows termination upon the good faith agreement of two licensed
physicians that the termination is appropriate. °
The differences between reform and traditional approaches may
affect the liability of physicians. The California and Colorado statutes
have added an element to the crime of abortion-the non-existence
of medical committee approval. The performing physician can insu-
late himself from prosecution for abortion by proving committee
approval." These two statutes do not require the doctor to evaluate
the decision of the committee, but only to obtain its approval. While
the decisions of Washington doctors who perform terminations are
judicially reviewed, California and Colorado shift that review and
the attendant liability to the hospital committees.' It should be
noted, of course, that a showing of bad faith or collusion between
regularly or on call for the purpose of determining the question of medical justifi-
cation in each individual case, and which maintains a written record, signed by
each member, of the proceedings and deliberations of such board.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967):
Only after the said woman has given her written consent for said abortion
to be performed, and if the said woman shall be a minor or incompetent as
adjudicated by any court of competent jurisdiction then only after permission
is given in writing by the parents, or if married, her husband, guardian or
person or persons standing in loco parentis to said minor or incompetent, and
Only when the said woman shall have resided in the State of North Carolina
for a period of at least four months immediately preceding the operation being
performed except in the case of emergency where the life of the said woman is
in danger, and
Only if the abortion is performed in a hospital licensed by the North
Carolina Medical Care Commission, and
Only after threee doctors of medicine not engaged jointly in private prac-
tice, one of whom shall be the person performing the abortion, shall have exam-
ined said woman and certified in writing the circumstances which they believe
to justify the abortion, and
Only when such certification shall have been submitted before the abortion
to the hospital where it is to be performed; provided, however, that where an
emergency exists, and the certificate so states, such certificate may be submitted
within twenty-four hours after the abortion. (1967, c. 367, s. 2.)
The English statute states: "A person shall not be guilty of an offence when a
pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner if that practitioner and
another registered medical practitioner are of the opinion, formed in good faith...,"
Samuels, supra note 1.
" Doctors in these two states can now predict quite reliably their potential
criminal liability. All intended terminations which are not emergencies and are
not performed pursuant to prior medical committee approval are violations of the
statutes. Those terminations receiving committee approval no longer fit the statute
definition of the illegal act.
- One must doubt the practical likelihood of abortion convictions against mem-
bers of a hospital committee. This would be especially true if the Washington
standard of prevailing medical opinion were applied. See note 6, supra. Even if these
conceptual problems were overcome, the technical problem arises of whether a vote
in favor of termination approval could be a violation of the abortion statute. If the
committee approval is characterized as advice rather than mere permission, the
committee would seem liable for erroneous decisions. Under this analysis what
1968]
147ASIlNGTOAN LI V REVIEW
the doctors and the examining board would negate the doctor's im-
munity.
In contrast, the procedures adopted by Great Britain and North
Carolina merely extend the traditional approach. The decision and
the liability is still with the practitioner, but he must now demonstrate
some prior professional agreement.": The doctors will not be insulated
from prosecution, but their evidentiary positions will improve. Be-
cause both statutes call for belief (explicitly "good faith" in the Eng-
lish statute and impliedly so in the North Carolina law) on the part
of the examiners that statutory conditions exist, the prosecution will
be able to impeach the doctors' testimony only through a showing
of collusion or professional inadequacy by all the examiners.14 One
should note that the hospital committees in California and Colorado
would stand on similar footing."
The construction of these official procedures in no way evidences
a "right" of the mother to have a legal termination. The California
law authorizes its physicians to terminate upon committee approval." '
North Carolina simply states that to produce a miscarriage in com-
pliance with statutory procedure is not unlawful." Colorado explicitly
denies the existence of an affirmative duty on the part of any hospital
to form an examining committee or to approve an appropriate term-
ination.18 Only the English statute, which provides that the expense
would be the position of a member of the committee who dissented from a committee
denial of permission?
"See notes 9 and 10, supra.
" There exists the remote possibility of good faith inadequacy of agreeing physi-
cians. More likely, an opinion "formed in good faith" implies the existence of an
adequate basis for forming the opinion.
' Note 12, supra.
1 0 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951 (West Supp. 1967):
A holder of the physician's and surgeon's certificate, as defined in the Busi-
ness and Professions Code, is authorized to perform an abortion or aid or assist
or attempt an abortion, only if each of the following requirements is met....
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967):
... it shall not be unlawful to advise, procure, or cause the miscarriage of a
pregnant woman or an abortion when the same is performed by a doctor of
medicine licensed to practice medicine in North Carolina, if he can reasonably
establish that ....
Ch. 190, [1967] Colo. Sess. Laws 285, § 4:
Nothing herein shall require a hospital to admit any patient under the provi-
sions of this act for the purposes of performing an abortion, nor shall any
hospital be required to appoint a special hospital board as defined in this act.
A person who is a member of or associated with the staff of a hospital or any
employee of a hospital in which a justified medical termination has been author-
ized and who shall state in writing an objection to such termination on moral
or religious grounds shall not be required to participate in the medical pro-
cedures which will result in the termination of a pregnancy and the refusal of
any such person to participate shall not form the basis for any disciplinary or
other recriminatory action against such person.
[ VoL. 43 : 639
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of the operation will be borne by the National Health Service, suggests
that the qualifying applicant would be able to assert such a right.19
Like the mother, the fetus has failed to achieve an improved pro-
cedural position in the reform legislation. Some contemporary notions
of the reproductive process fix life at the time of conception.20 It is
a short step from life to a right to life as protected in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. Can it be that termination pursuant to com-
mittee approval denies the fetus its right to counsel? As absurd as
the notion appears at first blush, it takes on some plausibility in view
of property rights and tort remedies afforded the fetus.2 Who could
establish standing to assert the rights of the fetus, assuming that
both parents have consented to the operation? These questions will
be mooted in most cases since human gestation tends to operate at
a faster pace than does the judicial system.
ON WHAT BASES IS THE DECISION MADE?
Popular interest in abortion reform arises from the definitions which
the new statutes supply for the examiners. These definitions attempt
to generalize the conditions which justify termination. Under the
traditional approach only terminations necessary to preserve the life
of the mother are excluded from the crime of abortion.22 All the
reform acts expand this notion to provide termination where there
is substantial risk of grave impairment of the physical or mental
health of the mother or where the pregnancy is the result of rape
or incest.2 3 North Carolina and Colorado further allow termination
" Samuels, supra note 1, at 11.
"See gencrally Drinan, The Inviolability of the Right to Be Born, in ABORTION
AND THE LAW 107 (D. Smith ed. 1967).
-See T. ATKINSON, WILLS 75 (2d ed. 1953) and W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
354-57 (3d ed. 1964).
"WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.010 (1950) is one example. Only four state statutes
provide no exception to the prohibition aginst intended miscarriage-Louisiana,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. George, Current Abortion Laws:
Proposals and Mozvements for Reform, in ABoRTION AND THE LAW 1 (D. Smith ed.
1967). Courts in two of these states have read in the "necessary to preserve the
mother's life" exception. Commonwealth v. Brunelle, 341 Mass. 675, 171 N.E.2d 850,
852 (1961). State v. Brandenbur, 137 N.J.L. 124, 58 A.2d 709 (1948). This exception
is important because it admits that even in these states protection of the fetus is not
absolute. Reform statutes simply define expanded exceptions to this protection.
' E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25950 (West Supp. 1967):
(c) The Committee of the Medical Staff finds that one or more of the
following conditions exist:
(1) There is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would
gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother;
(2) The pregnancy resulted from rape or incest.
19691
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where there is substantial risk of a gravely defective child.24 The
English statute goes beyond any American statute to justify termina-
tion when the "pregnant woman's capacity as a mother will be severely
overstrained by the care of a child or of another child....
Each of the reform statutes passed in the last year has included
grave impairment of the mother's physical health as a justification
for termination. This is partly a recognition of the advance of medical
science. Few medical conditions exist which are complicated by preg-
nancy to the extent that the mother's life is actually endangered."
But conditions which no longer endanger the mother's life may still
condemn her to lasting ill health.27 Thus preservation of life becomes
preservation of healthy life. The granting of this exception relieves
doctors from interpreting ambiguous symptoms as fatal. By eliminat-
' Ch. 190, [1967] Colo. Sess. Laws 284 (4) (a) (i): "[o]r the birth of a child
with grave and permanent physical deformity or mental retardation...." N.C. GEN
STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967) : "When abortion not unlawful.... There is substantial
risk that the child would be born with grave physical or mental defect ... "
Samuels, supra note 1.
Dr. Kenneth R. Niswander, M.D. reviewed the subject in his article, ,1edical
Abortion Practices in the United States in ABORTION AND THE LAw 41 (1). Smith ed.
1967). The following appears at 41-45:
(1) Cardiovascular Disease.... With improved prenatal care (including
the significant advances recently provided by cardiac surgery), the number of
women with cardiovascular disease whose life is actually in danger during
pregnancy has decreased substantially.
(2) Gastrointestinal Diseases.... There is general agreement that emotional
factors affect the medical course of the patient with ulcerative colitis. Since
pregnancy regularly and sometimes severely affects the emtional stability of
women, it has been felt that pregnancy may adversely affect the outcome of this
hazardous disease. Fortunately, the disease is not a common one.
(3) Renal Disease.... The risk of nephrolithiasis cannot be minimized,
but the instances when it might actually increase the risk of death in a pregnant
patient seem remote.
(4) Neurologic Disease.... There appears to be little evidence that the
disease (multiple sclerosis) actually increases the risk of death during preg-
nancy. Much the same can be said about epilepsy in a pregnant patient.
(5) Punonary Disease .... With the advent of drug therapy, tuberculosis
has practically disappeared as an indication for therapeutic abortion.
(6) Diabetes Mellitus.... The maternal mortality rate, however, is currently
considered to be essentially the same among diabetic patients as with the overall
pregnant population.
(7) .V1alignancy.... Majury says that "no convincing evidence has been
produced which shows that subsequent pregnancy affects adversely the prognosis
sion, carcinoma in other locations) has also been an accepted indication for
in extra-uterine malignancy." A history of carcinoma of the bowel (or, on occa-
therapeutic abortion; however, there is no convincing evidence that pregnancy
in any way adversely affects the outcome of these neoplastic diseases.
(8) Other Medical Diseases. Rheumatoid arthritis, hyperthyroidism, lacer-
ated cervix, multiple fibroids, mumps in the first trimester, and other miscellane-
ous diseases too numerous to mention have also indicated therapeutic abortion.
It is difficult to prove that many of these diseases actually threaten the life of
the pregnant patient, and social factors often seem to be a prominent consideration
in the decision to abort.
K. Ryan, M.D., Humane Abortion Laws and the Health Needs of Society, in
ABORTIoN AND TIE LAw 60, 69 (D. Smith ed. 1967).
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ing this conflict-between absolute medical honesty and legal com-
mands-the reforms may only be a more accurate description of the
current medical interpretation of "necessary to preserve life."
The California, Colorado, and English statutes explicitly allow term-
ination to protect the mental health of the mother.2" California
defines mental health as "mental illness to the extent that the woman
is dangerous to herself or to the person or property of others or is
in need of supervision or restraint."" This apparent discrimination
in favor of violent forms of psychosis may be the outgrowth of the
practice under traditional statutes of granting "psychiatric abortions"
where there is a threat of suicide. Colorado requires certification by
a medical doctor specializing in psychiatry that the continued preg-
nancy will result in "serious permanent impairment of the mental
health of the woman."3 The English statute places no restrictions on
the definition of the term,3 and North Carolina relies only on the word
"health."32 Once the very real tragedies of mental illness resulting
from carrying a child to term are recognized, this exception stands on
the same justifying grounds as the exception for preservation of phys-
ical health. This too may be a reflection of medical practice under
the traditional statutes which has seen a striking increase in the num-
ber of "psychiatric abortions."3
Only the California reform does not include substantial risk of a
gravely defective child as justification for termination. The inclusion
of this provision in the other statutes is empirically explainable by
the 1964 rubella epidemic and the 1962 thalidomide tragedy.34 The-
oretical justification for such termination assumes either that the
' CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25950 (West Supp. 1967); ch. 190, [1967] Colo.
Sess. Laws 284: "(4) (a) (i) ... or the serious permanent impairment of the mental
health of the woman as confirmed in writing under the signature of a licensed doctor
of medicine specializing in psychiatry...."; English statute per Samuels, supra note
1. "(a) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve serious risk to the life or
of grave injury to the health, whether physical or mental, of the pregnant woman
whether before, at or after the birth of the child...."
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25954 (West Supp. 1967).
Note 28, supra.
"Note 28, supra.
"Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967) abortion is not unlawful when
"There is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would threaten the life
or gravely impair the health of the said woman...."
' Niswander, supra note 26, at 52.
"Id. at 46-47. The case receiving most publicity was that of Mrs. Sherri Fink-
bine who was denied a therapeutic abortion when it was discovered she had inad-
vertantly taken thalidomide. She eventually travelled to Sweden and obtained a
termination. See generally Lader, Scandal of Abortion Laws, N.Y. Times, April
25, 1965, § 6 (Magazine), at 32.
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defective unborn are better dead than alive," or that social and
psychological preferences outweigh the infringement of fetal rights.
This view poses the operation in terms of preventive medicine. The
doctor is allowed the full extent of his medical expertise in diagnosing
and remedying the abnormality. Opponents of this view doubt that
termination of life is a proper remedy in the science of healing."
Termination of pregnancies resulting from rape is excused by all
the reform statutes. To the extent that such a pregnancy risks serious
impairment of the mother's mental or physical health, this provision
does no more than enumerate a specific case already covered in general
exceptions. To the extent the pregnancy does not produce that degree
of impairment, this provision grants an exception on grounds other
than medical. The rationale for the exception is questionable. If
the fact of an unwanted pregnancy were the only criterion, termination
upon demand would be the appropriate approach. The difference
between unwanted pregnancies resulting from rape and other un-
wanted pregnancies is consent to sexual intercourse. Isolation of this
element demonstrates the retributive focus of abortion prohibitions.
Furthermore, one reform disallows termination for statutory rape
where the girl is 15 or over ,: thus requiring absence of consent for
termination but not for a statutory rape conviction.
Only the British statute allows termination where "... the pregnant
woman's capacity as a mother will be severely overstrained by the
care of a child or of another child.... ."" To the extent that a
woman's "capacity as a mother" includes factors other than her phys-
ical and mental health, this exception allows termination for social
and economic reasons. What is the justification for this exception?
The answer is a rather bold admission that the well-being of the
mother and her other children is being favored over the well-being
of the unborn. The condition requires a procedure which will act
quickly taking into account medical conditions and their social impli-
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967), held that even if the
mother had been misled as to the chances of a defective child, and even if legal termin-
ation would have been possible, there could be no recovery since: 1) It is impossible to
compare a defective baby with no baby at all, and 2) The right of mother and father
not to be injured emotionally and financially does not outweigh right of the child
to live.
" N. MIETUs, TIiE THERAPEUTIc ABORTIWO AcT-A STATEMENT IN OPPOSITIoN
35 (1967).
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25952 (c) (West Supp. 1967).
Samuels, supra note 1.
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cations. If doctors are not qualified to make these predictions, this
exception may be challenged as desirable, but impractical.3 9 '
Satisfaction of the statute definition does not automatically allow
termination. The North Carolina act further restricts the class of
pregnancies eligible for termination by requiring a four month prior
residency of the mother.4" Apparently this requirement is a reaction
to the fear that the new law would create an "abortion mill." One
must note the ambiguous social policy resulting. The purpose of the
statutory procedure is to discover certain facts. If those facts are
found to exist, the termination is not criminal. If not encouraged,
such terminations are at least approved. What is the characteristic
of state residency that makes these terminations appropriate for North
Carolina women, but inappropriate for similarly situated women from
neighboring states? No state expense is incurred by the North Caro-
lina procedure. Denying non-residents access to this procedure may
be explained as non-interference in the legislative judgments of other
states. Legal termination thus joins divorce as a guarded state privi-
lege.
CONCLUSION
The abortion reforms were produced by legislatures reacting to
long-term changes in communal mores. The expanded conditions re-
sulted from the feeling that the traditional prohibition was too in-
clusive. But a feeling that such expansion should be cautious produced
procedural requirements not previously felt to be necessary. These
results were not achieved by deciding that a fetus is more like an
' There is some feeling that this condition will be interpreted primarily in
medical terms, minimizing its socio-economic aspects. To the extent that "capacity
as a mother" includes more than medical evaluation, opinions of social workers,
psychologists, and others may be helpful. But the British currently prefer uncompli-
cated decision-making in this area. See Samuels, supra note 1, at 13.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967). The chance of complication increases
significantly after the twelfth week of pregnancy. H. Hoffmeyer, M.D., Medical
Aspects of the Danish Legislation on Abortion in ABORTION AND THE LAW 179 at 196
(D. Smith ed. 1967). A non-resident who discovers her pregnancy one month after
conception would not meet the residency requirement until the twenty-second week of
pregnancy. Only in extreme cases will termination be performed during the late
stages of pregnancy. Hoffmeyer, supra, at 196. Thus non-residents seeking termina-
tion in North Carolina must show the urgency required by the medical profession to
justify termination in a late stage of pregnancy. And if this higher standard is met,
the non-resident is subjected to greater dangers resulting from the delay. The Cal-
ifornia statute requires that no terminations will be allowed past the twentieth week
of pregnancy. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25953 (West Supp. 1967).
The Colorado statute requires that terminations on the basis of rape take place
within the first sixteen weeks of pregnancy. Ch. 190 [1967] Colo. Sess. Laws 284.
1968]
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appendix than a citizen; rather, they present a compromise between
those who would allow all terminations and those who would permit
none.
WRONGFUL DEATH OF A MINOR CHILD: THE
CHANGING PARENTAL INJURY
In Washington, an action may be brought by a parent for the
wrongful death of a child along either1 of two statutory avenues.2 The
general wrongful death statute creates a right of action in the dece-
dent's personal representative for the benefit of parents who may be
dependent upon the deceased for support.' Under the so-called "child-
' Election of remedies problems created by the overlapping statutes are treated
briefly in Comment, Damages in ,Vashington Wrongful Death Actions, 35 WASH.
L. REv. 441, 443 (1960).
-\vVAsHi. REv. CODE §§4.20.010, .020 (1965) and WASH. REv. CODE §4.24.010
(1965).
Under early Anglo Saxon law the "wergild" system of monetary awards allowed
recovery by parties affected by the death of another: his King, lord, and next of
kin. The system functioned primarily however in a punitive fashion and disappeared
with the development of criminal process. (See 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 52 (1895). This qualification aside, there was at common law no
action for wrongful death. Hedrick v. Ilwaco R. & Nav. Co., 4 Wash. 400, 30 P. 714(1892). Recovery is therefore exclusively by statute in all jurisdictions except, per-
haps, Hawaii.
"Wrongful death" and "survival" statutes enacted in various jurisdictions differ
with respect both to parties entitled to maintain the action and measure of damage.
"Survival" statutes preserve the cause of action the deceased himself could have
maintained had he lived. See WASH. REv. CODE § 4.20.060 (1965) for Washington's
survival statute. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.010, .020 provide for "true" wrongful death
recovery. Patterned basically after Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act, 9 &
10 Vict. c. 93 (1846)), these provisions do not merely prevent termination of the
decedent's claim; they create an action for "wrongful death" in named statutory
beneficiaries. Although some jurisdictions allow recovery by the decedent's estate for
its losses, Washington has no such "estate" statute.
In Washington, the general wrongful death statute provides:
WASH. REv. CODE § 4.20.010-Right of Action. When the death of a person is
caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another his personal represen-
tative may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the
death; and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances
as amount, in law, to a felony.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.020-Beneficiaries of Action. Every such action shall
be for the benefit of the wife, husband, child or children or the person whose
death shall have been so caused. If there be no wife or husband or child or
children, such action may be maintained for the benefit of the parents, sisters,
or minor brothers, who may be dependent upon the deceased person for support,
and who are resident within the United States at the time of his death.
In every such action the jury may give such damages as, under all circum-
stances of the case, may to them seem just.
"Dependent" has been construed to mean "substantial," though not total, de-
pendence. See note 37 infra.
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